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ABSTRACT
The inequitable conduct defense remains a viable defense in patent
litigation today, as illustrated in four 2003 Federal Circuit decisions.
Though an alleged patent infringer must establish the elements of
materiality and intent for a valid inequitable conduct defense, recent
Federal Circuit decisions indicate that certain factual underpinnings
bearing on materiality can raise an inference of intent. To most
effectively counter this inference of intent, a plausible explanation for
the questioned conduct should be provided by the patentee. However,
in providing such plausible explanation, the patentee runs the risk of
waiving privileged communications, which in turn may result in far
more intrusive and costly discovery.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1988, the Federal Circuit characterized the practice of charging inequitable
conduct in patent cases as "an absolute plague."1 Despite the court's admonition,
inequitable conduct battles continue to rage in patent litigation as evidenced in four
Federal Circuit decisions issued in 2003.
In Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., the Federal Circuit upheld a
district court's summary judgment finding of inequitable conduct where, among other
things, the inventors of the patented invention falsely represented to the United
States Patent and Trademark Office ("Patent Office") that they had performed a
2
protocol procedure and achieved the result described in its patent specification.
Shortly thereafter, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., the
Federal Circuit affirmed a district court's summary judgment inequitable conduct
decision where the inventors intentionally withheld material information in the form
3
of a prior art article during the prosecution of the patent applications.
The Hoffmann -La Roche and Bristol-Myers decisions were followed by decisions
in Dayco Products,Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc.4 and Ulead Systems, Inc. v. Lex
Computer & Management Corp.5 In both Dayco and Uead, the Federal Circuit
vacated and remanded summary judgment findings of inequitable conduct. In Dayco,
the Federal Circuit determined that the materiality of a withheld reference
presented a question of fact requiring a trial. 6 The court also found error in the
district court's finding of an intent to deceive the Patent Office because the plaintiff
submitted declarations explaining why the reference was not given to the Patent
Office. 7 Similarly, in Ulead, the Federal Circuit found a trial was required to
determine whether an intent to deceive the Patent Office existed because the
patentee presented testimony from its general counsel and its patent counsel, that
they had acted innocently when they mistakenly claimed small entity status under
35 U.S.C. § 1.9(f).8

*Mr. Kowalchyk is a Senior Vice President and Director at the firm of Merchant & Gould P.C.
His practice includes all aspects of intellectual property law with an emphasis on patent litigation,
client counseling, and alternative dispute resolution. Mr. Johnson is an associate at the firm of
Merchant & Gould. His practice emphasizes patent and trademark litigation. The views expressed
herein are solely those of the authors. This article does not necessarily state the views of the firm of
Merchant & Gould, P.C., nor of any lawyer or client of the firm.
1 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
2 323 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
3 326 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
4 329 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
351 F.3d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Dayco, 329 F.3d at 1367.
7 Id. at 1366-67.
8 Ulead,351 F.3d at 1148.
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These four cases exemplify the fact-specific nature of inequitable conduct
disputes. The ultimate decision of whether inequitable conduct occurred can turn on
documentary evidence and the veracity of witnesses, including experts and
participants, in obtaining the challenged patent. Decisions as to what exculpatory
evidence and testimony are needed can be critical to maintaining a successful
defense. While the Federal Circuit may not favor the inequitable conduct defense,
these most recent decisions indicate that alleged infringers will continue to rely on
this costly, time-consuming and contentious defense.

I. THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT STANDARD
Inequitable conduct refers to intentional acts and omissions of a patent
applicant or representative of a patent applicant during the course of obtaining a
patent from the Patent Office. 9 Inequitable conduct consists of an "affirmative
misrepresentation of a material fact, failure to disclose material information, or
submission of false material information, coupled with an intent to deceive."10 The
party alleging inequitable conduct must prove the threshold elements of materiality
of the misstatement or omission and intent to deceive the Patent Office by clear and
convincing evidence.
The district court then weighs the threshold findings of
materiality and intent in light of all the circumstances to determine whether the
patent applicant's conduct warrants a conclusion that the patent should be held
unenforceable. 12
The determination of inequitable conduct is committed to the district court's
discretion. 13 To be overturned, "the appellant must establish that the ruling is based
on clearly erroneous findings of fact or on a misapplication or misinterpretation of
applicable law, or evidences a clear error of judgment on the part of the district
court."1

4

The district court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court

has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. 15
Both intent and materiality are questions of fact that must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence. 16 However, once a threshold of materiality has been
established, the inquiry focuses upon whether the patentee intended to mislead the
patent examiner.
The evidence of intent to mislead the Patent Office can rarely be demonstrated
with direct evidence. Thus, "smoking gun" evidence is not required to establish an
intent to deceive.17 Rather, an accused infringer can prove intent by the acts of the
applicant and the presumption that the natural consequences of those acts were
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1988); 37
C.F.R. § 1.56 (2002).
10Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
11

Id.

12Id.

Id.
Id.
15 Id.
16Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
17 Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1189-90 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
13
14
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presumably intended by the actor. 18 Generally, the courts will infer intent from the
facts and circumstances surrounding the applicant's conduct. 19
An accused infringer cannot rely solely on undisclosed prior art's materiality to
prove the intent element. 20
However, the more material the omission or the
misstatement, the lower the level of evidence required to show the requisite intent,
and vice versa. 21 As asserted in Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chemical Co., an
affirmative misrepresentation by the patentee, in contrast to a misleading omission,
22
is more likely to be regarded as material.
A finding of inequitable conduct can lead to the devastating consequence of
rendering a patent unenforceable.23 Therefore, despite the Federal Circuit's stated
distaste for such charges, the accused infringers and their attorneys continue to
24
develop novel bases for making allegations of misconduct.

II. THE RECENT FEDERAL CIRCUIT INEQUITABLE CONDUCT CASES

A. Hoffmann -LaRoehe, Inc., v. Promega Corp.25
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., ("Hoffmann") sued Promega Corporation ("Promega")
for alleged infringement of Hoffmann's United States Patent No. 4,889,818 ("the '818
patent"').26 The '818 patent is directed to the isolation of a purified thermostable
enzyme ("Thermus aquaticus" or "Taq") used in DNA synthesis. 27 In response,
Promega counterclaimed, asserting that the '818 patent was unenforceable due to
28
inequitable conduct.
After conducting a bench trial, the district court found for Promega, identifying
three categories of material misrepresentations and related omissions made by the
patentee with intent to deceive the Patent Office that constituted inequitable
conduct, rendering the '818 patent unenforceable. 29 The categories of the district

1s Molins, 48 F.3d at 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
19

Id. at 1180-81.

20Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp., 975 F.2d 815, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
21 Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
22 722 F.2d 1556, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
23 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988)

24See Lisa A. Dolick, The Inequitable Conduct Doctrine."Lessons From Recent Cases, 84 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 719, 719 (2002).
25 323 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
26 Cetus Corporation was the original patentee and filed United States Application Serial No.
07/063,509 that ultimately issued as the '818 patent. Id. at 1358. Cetus licensed the '818 patent to
Promega in June of 1990. Id. at 1359. Cetus subsequently sold the '818 patent to Hoffmann. Id.
Following the sale of the '818 patent to Hoffmann, Promega allegedly breached the license
agreement. Id. Hoffmann filed suit, alleging patent infringement and breach of contract. Id.
27Id. at 1358.
28 Id. at 1359.
21)Id. Initially, Promega moved for summary judgment of inequitable conduct. Id. The district
court granted Promega's motion relating to whether material misrepresentations or omissions were
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court's findings were: (i) misrepresentations regarding the difference in molecular
weight between the claimed and prior art Taq enzymes; (2) misrepresentations that
the inventors had performed Example VI (one of the procedures described in the
specification) and that they had achieved the described results; and (3)
misrepresentations concerning the comparative fidelity and template dependence of
30
the claimed enzyme and the prior art enzymes.
As described below, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's findings on
the first category ("Molecular Weight"), but upheld the second ("Example VI") and
31
third ("Comparison of Fidelity") findings.

1. Molecular Weight
In the prosecution of the '818 patent, the inventors distinguished their invention
from the prior art by asserting that their enzyme had a higher molecular weight than
the prior art enzyme.3 2 The district court found that the inventors had made two
material omissions to the Patent Office regarding the molecular weight of the
claimed and prior art enzymes.33 First, an undisclosed experiment conducted by one
of the inventors (the Soffel experiment) was believed by the district court to cast
doubt on the inventors' representations that the claimed invention had a higher
molecular weight than the prior art enzyme. 34 Second, the district court believed the
inventors failed to disclose that the technique used by the prior art scientist to
determine the molecular weight of the prior art enzyme was inaccurate and produced
3 5
an underestimate of the true weight of the prior art.
The original claims of the '818 patent were rejected based upon prior journal
publications by Chien, et al. ("Chien") and Kaledin, et al. ("Kaledin"), which disclosed
a DNA polymerase derived from Thermus aquaticus or "Taq" bacterium. 36 In
explaining the rejection, the examiner stated that "it is not clear whether or not the
molecular weight . . . claimed by applicants for the instant enzyme is a result of
experimental parameters or an enzyme activity different than the [enzyme]
previously described in the literature." 37 The patentee responded by presenting a
new independent claim setting forth a molecular weight range for a Taq enzyme
significantly higher than the ranges reported by Chien and Kaledin. 38 In remarks,

made to the Patent Office and then conducted a bench trial on the issue of the patentee's intent to
deceive the Patent Office. Id.
'3 Id. at 1359-60.
31 Id. at 1360.
32 Id.
'33 Id.

at 1360-63.

Id. at 1360.
3 Id. at 1361.
'3 Id. at 1358. The Chien reference described an enzyme with a molecular weight of 63,000
68,000 daltons; the Kaledin reference described an enzyme with a molecular weight of 60,000 62,000
daltons. Id. at 1360.
37 Id. at 1358.
38 Id. at 1358-59.
Claim 1 of the '818 patent claimed: "Purified thermostable Thermus
aquaticus DNA polymerase that migrates on a denaturing polyacrylamide gel faster than
phosphorylase B and more slowly than does bovine serum albumin and has an estimated molecular
34
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the patentee pointed to the differences in molecular weight of the prior art enzyme
and the claimed enzymes, and that Chien and Kaledin had identified "a crude
preparation of degraded Taq polymerase" in their journal articles. 39

a. The Undisclosed Soffel Experiment
On summary judgment, the Soffel experiment was found to suggest that the
prior art enzyme was not a degraded form of Taq. 40 The failure to describe the Soffel
experiment to the Patent Office was thus determined by the district court to be a
material omission on the part of the inventors. 41 However, the Federal Circuit
reversed, holding that there were genuine issues of fact regarding both materiality
42
and intent of the inventors regarding the non-disclosure.
The Federal Circuit agreed with Hoffmann's argument that the Soffel
experiment was not material to patentability, determining that the Soffel experiment
was conducted under conditions very different than those described in the Chien
prior art experiment.43 Therefore, it was not clear whether the withheld experiment
44
was material to determining the correct molecular weight of the patentee's enzyme.
In reversing the district court's finding that the inventors had intentionally
failed to disclose the Soffel experiment, the Federal Circuit pointed to unrebutted
testimony that the inventors considered the salt concentration significant to the
failure of the Taq enzyme to bind. 45 The court indicated that because the salt
concentration used in the Soffel experiment was significantly different than in the
experiments conducted by Chien, the inventors would not have considered the result
weight of 86,000 90,000 daltons when compared with a phosphorylase B standard assigned a
molecular weight of 92,500 daltons." U.S. Patent No. 4,889,818 (issued Dec. 26, 1989).
'39Hoffman-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1359-60.
40 Id. Co-inventor, Susanne Soffel, performed an experiment in which she applied a protein
sample to a phosphocellulose column. Id. "She observed that a Taq fragment with a molecular
weight of 62,000 daltons did not bind to the phosphocellulose column." Id.
41 Id.

42JTd.
at 1360-61.
43 Id.
Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that the ability of a particle to bind to the
phosphocellulose column is dependent upon the salt concentration of the buffer in which the
phosphocellulose is suspended. -d. at 1360. The salt concentration of the buffer used in the Soffel
experiment was significantly higher than it was in the buffer used in the Chien experiment. Id. at
1361.

44Id.

at 1361.

Id. There was testimony that when a difficulty with an enzyme sticking to the column was
encountered, Dr. Gelfand suggested reducing the salt concentration to around 40 mM. Id. The
consequence of Dr. Gelfand's suggestion "was that the salt concentration of the load in this column
was probably too high .. . [a]nd .. .to get that material to stick to the column, one needed to lower
the salt concentration ..... Id. In addition:
Ms. Stoffel testified that experiments showed that the fragment did not bind when
it was loaded at a salt concentration of 80 mM, but that "itstuck but it eluted
earlier in the gradient" at a salt concentration of 10 mM-the concentration in
Chien's experiment. When the inventors noted that the proteolyzed enzyme did
not bind to phosphocellulose, they included a reference to the restriction "at 80
mM salt," indicating that they considered the salt concentration significant to the
failure to bind.
45
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of the Soffel experiment to have any bearing on whether Chien had isolated a
46
fragment of the Taq enzyme.

b. The UndisclosedInformation Relating to Inaccuracyof Size Exclusion
Chroma tography
The district court also found that the inventors had improperly withheld
information suggesting that the technique Chien used to determine molecular weight
of his Taq enzyme was inaccurate and resulted in an underestimate of the true
weight. 47 The district court believed that disclosure of that information to the Patent
Office would have weakened the inventors' argument that the claimed invention was
different than the prior art enzyme. 48 The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district
court's conclusion on materiality, concluding that none of the evidence cited proved
that the molecular weight recorded by Chien was too low. 49 The Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's inequitable conduct finding to the extent the district
court relied on the representations and omissions regarding the molecular weights of
50
the prior art and claimed Taq enzymes.

46

Id.

Id. at 1361. Chein used size exclusion chromatography to measure the weight of the Taq
enzyme produced. Id. In the size exclusion chromatography procedure at issue, the sample of the
protein to be weighed is placed in a column filled with porous beads (sometimes referred to as a
"matrix"). Id. Then:
17

A buffer solution is run through the column. The proteins in the sample that are
larger than the pore size of the beads will flow around the beads and out the
bottom of the column. The smaller proteins will enter the pores between the
beads, thus retarding their progress through the column. As a result, the speed at
which a protein "elutes," or moves through the column, corresponds to its
molecular weight. The faster a protein moves through the column, the greater its
molecular weight. If, however, a protein ... has a chemical affinity for the matrix,
it may move through the column more slowly than would be expected, resulting in
an underestimation of its molecular weight.

Id.
Id. at 1361.
49 Id. at 1362. The information relied upon by the district court consisted of the results of
purification and sizing experiment by the inventors, data concerning Taq's tendency to avoid
interacting with water, and an internal memorandum indicating Taq "migrates differently on
Zorbax." Id. In reversing, the Federal Circuit held that the experiments by the inventors would not
show that the Sephadex G- 100 chemical product used by Chien would bind with the matrix. Id. The
inventors used a wholly different chemical product (Zorbox and Ultrogel) in their experiments. Id.
The Federal Circuit also concluded that the district court failed to consider the chemical properties
of Sephadex when it concluded that Taq's tendency to avoid interacting with water resulted in an
underestimation of its molecular weight. Id. Finally, the internal memo was not conclusive on
whether Taq would interact with Sephadex used by Chien. Id. at 1363.
5o Id. The Federal Circuit did not address the issue of intent to deceive the Patent Office with
regard to the failure to disclose information suggesting the underreporting of the molecular weight
of Chien's Taq. Id.
48
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2. Example VI
The district court also made findings related to misrepresentations made by the
inventors concerning the performance of and results achieved in a purification
protocol ("Example VI") described in the '818 patent. 51 Specifically, the district court
found that the inventors intentionally misrepresented to the Patent Office that they
had performed the procedure described in the Example VI protocol and achieved the
represented results. 52 Example VI in the patent specification concluded as follows:
Active fractions with no detectable nuclease(s) were pooled and run on a
silver stained SDS-page mini gel. The results show a single 88 kd band
with a specific activity of 250,000 units/mg. This specific activity is more
than an order of magnitude higher than that claimed for the previously
isolated Taq polymerase and is at least an order of magnitude higher than
53
that for E. eolipolymerase 1.
The district court found that use of the past tense falsely suggested to the
examiner that the Example VI protocol had been performed when it had not.54 The
statements regarding purity, specifically, that Example VI resulted in a "nucleasefree preparation," that the inventors had achieved a specific activity of "250,000
units/mg," and that the claimed specific activity of the "produced" enzymes was
significantly higher than in the prior art, were considered material to the issue of
patentability. 55 The district court also concluded that the representations were
56
knowingly false.

a. Hoffmann s Misrepresentations
The district court found that the inventors used the past tense in describing the
steps of the Example VI protocol on more than seventy-five occasions. 57 Use of the
past tense implied to the reader that the inventors performed the Example VI
protocol and achieved the described results. 58 However, at trial, the inventors
admitted that they had never performed the Example VI protocol and never achieved
59
the results they claimed.
Hoffmann attempted to explain that it was not necessary that the Example VI
protocol be performed from start to finish exactly as written. 60 Hoffmann claimed the
actual steps in the procedure were part of two separate procedures which had been

51 Id.
5'2 Id.

53

Id.
Id. at 1364.

Id.
56 Id. at 1367.
Id. at 1364.
I,7
55

58

59

Id.

d.

(30
Id.
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performed by the inventors. 61 The district court rejected Hoffmann's argument that
Example VI was, in effect, performed through the combination of steps from two
different preparations. 62 The Federal Circuit agreed and found the representation
63
concerning performance of the Example VI protocol was false.
Significant to the Federal Circuit's decision was the disparity in evidence
presented by Promega and Hoffmann. 64 The accused infringer, Promega, offered
expert testimony that doing the preparations Hoffmann relied upon would not
provide an accurate representation of the results of a procedure conducted according
to Example VI.65 Hoffmann offered no evidence contradicting this expert testimony
regarding the importance of the order of the steps, or leading to the conclusion that
the results of two separate tests give an accurate representation of the entire
66
experiment.
The district court also found that the patentee misrepresented to the Patent
Office that the Example VI protocol resulted in: a nuclease-free preparation, an
enzyme with a specific activity of 250,000 units/mg, and an enzyme with a specific
activity 10 times that of the prior art enzyme.67 At trial, the inventors admitted that
they had relied upon the results of a different protocol test and that the resulting
enzyme from that step was not nuclease-free. 68 The Federal Circuit upheld the
district court's finding that affirmative misrepresentations were made to the Patent
69
Office regarding the Example VI protocol.

b. Intent to Deceive
In upholding the district court's finding that Hoffmann had made statements to
deceive the Patent Office, the Federal Circuit pointed out that "[misrepresentations
by themselves are not enough to render a patent unenforceable; the
misrepresentations must be intentional and they must be material to

61Id.
G2 Id.

(3 Id. at 1365.
6

Id.

( Id. Specifically, Dr. Mosbaugh testified that one "cannot fuse these [separate preparations]
together and get any prediction as to what the outcome would be." Id.
(36Id.

(7 Td. at 1365-67. The patentee misrepresented to the Patent Office that "active fractions with
no detectable nuclease(s) were pooled and run on a silver stained SDS PAGE mini-gel" and that "the
Taq polymerase purified as described above in Example VI was found to be free of any
contaminating Taq endonuclease and exonuclease activities." Id. at 1365-66.
68 Id. at 1365. The patentee also falsely represented they achieved an enzyme with a specific
activity of 250,000 units/mg. Id.at 1366. On summary judgment, the court determined that using
the definition of "unit" set forth in the Example VI protocol, only a magnitude of 100,000 units/mg
was achieved. Id. The district court also found that the patentee's comparison of the specific
activity of the claimed enzyme and the prior art enzyme was deceptive. Id. The inventors had twice
represented to the Patent Office that the claimed enzyme had a specific activity 10 times that of the
prior art enzyme. Id. However, Promega's expert testified that the prior art and claimed enzymes
were not assayed under the same conditions. Id. The district court found the contrary testimony of
Hoffmann's expert not credible. Td.
( Id.at 1363-66.
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patentability."70 Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit upheld the finding that the
inventors' affirmative misrepresentation was deceptive, and that Hoffmann had the
requisite intent. 71 The Federal Circuit noted that the inventors attested that all
statements made in their patent application were true.7 2 Hoffmann did not provide
any evidence suggesting that the use of the past tense language was merely an
oversight and not knowingly false.7 3 Rather, Hoffmann argued that Example VI was
included as simply a best mode disclosure.74 The Federal Circuit countered that "the
best mode requirement, however, does not entitle the inventor to suggest that the
best mode has been performed when it has not. .... 75
Hoffmann also argued that the inventors believed they had discovered a novel
enzyme. 76 However, the Federal Circuit responded that a good faith belief "does not
permit [an applicant] to make misrepresentations in seeking to persuade the
examiner to issue a patent ...
77 Because the inventors knew that past tense
language indicates that the experiment had actually been performed, intent to
deceive was inferred from its use in the patent.78 Furthermore, Hoffmann failed to
79
adequately explain why past tense language was utilized.

c.Materialityof the Misrepresentations
The Federal Circuit also upheld the district court's finding that the inventors'
mischaracterizations to the Patent Office regarding the purity comparison of the
fidelity and template dependency of the claimed enzyme and the prior art enzymes
were material to patentability.8 0 Hoffmann argued that the representation was not
81
material because the patent did not include claim limitations directed to purity.
The Federal Circuit rejected that argument stating that "[m]ateriality .. .is not
limited to matters reflected in the claims of a patent."8 2 Further, the Federal Circuit,
citing its decision in Robm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., indicated that

70 Id.
71 Id.

72

at 1366-67.
at 1367.

Id.

73Id.

In addition:
There was no suggestion by Roche that the use of the past tense in Example VI
was an oversight-Dr. Gelfand admitted he understood that, at least in a
scientific publication, the use of the past tense means that an experiment was
actually performed. He provided no reasonable explanation as to why a different
principle would apply in a patent application.

Id.
7'Id.
75 Id.

76;
Id.

77Id.
78 Id.

7 Id.
80 Id.at 1368.
SI Id.at 1367.
82 Id.
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affirmative misrepresentations are more likely regarded as material than mere
83
omissions.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit noted that in response to the initial rejection by
the Patent Office, the patentee asserted that the claimed enzyme's purity was
different from the prior art enzyme as an alternative argument to support
patentability. 84 Because the patentee had argued that the patent could have issued
based upon the asserted purity, a reasonable examiner would have considered
information about the purity in Example VI and referenced in the office action to be
8 5
material.

3. Comparison ofFidelity
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court's finding that the inventors
had made misrepresentations in comparing the fidelity and template dependence of
the claimed enzyme and prior art enzyme.8 6 In the application and during
prosecution of the application, the inventors claimed that their enzyme exhibited a
high fidelity, while the prior art enzyme did not.8 7 Although the statements
regarding their own enzyme were correct, the statements characterizing the activity
of the prior art enzymes and comparing it to that of the claimed enzyme were
inaccurate.8 8 Promega's expert testified "the differing results referred to by the
inventors in the office action response related to differences in experimental
conditions (specifically, differences in the DNA templates used) and not to differences
in the properties of the enzymes."8 9 Hoffmann offered no expert testimony to refute
the testimony of Promega's expert. 90 Rather, Hoffmann countered by arguing that
Promega's expert and the inventors differed over how to interpret the experimental
results relied on by the inventors. 91 The court found, however, that Hoffmann "failed
to make a persuasive showing that there was a legitimate difference of scientific
opinion on that issue."

92

83 Td. at 1367 (citing Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1571 (Fed. Cir.

1983)).
84 Id. at 1367-68.
85 Id. at 1368.
86 Id. at 1369-72.
87 In the application that became the '818 patent, "the inventors posited that their

claimed enzyme exhibited high fidelity while the prior art enzyme experienced
misincorporation." Id. at 1369. The inventors stated:
[W]hen only one or more nucleotide triphosphates were eliminated from a DNA
polymerase assay reaction mixture, very little, if any, activity was observed
using the enzyme herein, and the activity was consistent with the expected
value, and with an enzyme exhibiting high fidelity. In contrast, the activity
observed using the Kaledin et al. (supra) enzyme is not consistent with the
expected value, and suggests misincorporation of nucleotide triphosphate(s).

Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1370.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
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As with the purity issue, the affirmative misrepresentation to the Patent Office
regarding fidelity was deemed material. 9,
The inventors made the assertions
regarding fidelity to support their contention that the claimed enzyme was different
from the prior art enzyme cited by the examiner. 94 The claim of greater fidelity was
therefore intended to demonstrate, along with the purported difference in molecular
weight, that the claimed enzyme was not the same as the enzyme described in the
95
prior art references and, accordingly, was patentable.
The Federal Circuit found the statements the patentee made regarding fidelity
were intentionally deceptive as well.96 The court stated that "[]i]ntent ... is typically
proved inferentially," and the Promega expert witness testified that "he did not
believe that a scientist aware of the information . . . in the records could truthfully
make the statements found in the specification and office action response and that
[the inventors were] knowledgeable about that information." 97 Hoffmann did not put
forward evidence to contradict Promega's expert witness statements about whether
the inventors' interpretation, although inaccurate, was reasonable. 98 Nor did the
inventors testify about their knowledge in the field or whether they believed their
statements in the office action response to be truthful. 99 For these reasons, both
threshold requirements were met, and the Federal Circuit upheld the district court's
finding of inequitable conduct.100
The Federal Circuit indicated that an important step in the judicial resolution of
inequitable conduct claims is the court's determination of "whether the material
misrepresentations or omissions in question are sufficiently serious in light of the
evidence of intent to deceive, under all the circumstances, to warrant the severe
sanction of holding the patent unenforceable."' 10 1 Because the district court had not
previously performed this step in the inequitable conduct analysis, the case was
vacated and remanded to determine whether the two incidents of inequitable conduct
10 2
affirmed by the Federal Circuit were sufficient to render the patent unenforceable.

B. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., v. Rhone -PouleneRorer, Ine.10 3
Bristol-Meyers Squibb, Co. ("Bristol"), the accused infringer, sued RhonePoulenc Rorer, Inc. ("RPR"), seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement,
invalidity, and unenforceability of RPR's United States Patent No. RE 34,277 ("the
'277 patent").104 The '277 patent related to a semi-synthesis of Taxol®, a cancer
chemotherapeutic agent. 10 5 One of the problems the invention overcame in the semi9 Id. at
91Id. at
9 Id. at
96 Id. at

1371.
1369.
1371.
1368-72.

97 Id. at 1371.
98 Id. at 1372.

99 Id.
100 Id.
101

Id.

102Id.

103 326 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
101Id. at 1229.
105, Id.
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synthesis of Taxol® was preventing unwanted products from bonding to the main
chemical structure (known as the "10-DAB").1°6 The inventors of the '277 patent
developed a method of using "protecting groups" to prevent the unwanted side
7
reactions on the 10-DAB, clearing the way for the formation of Taxol®.O
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of claim construction
and the inventor's failure to disclose a prior art article to the Patent Office.108 The
district court then found by clear and convincing evidence that the RPR inventors
had committed inequitable conduct by not providing the prior art article to the
Patent Office. 10 9 Thereafter, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
of materiality and intent to deceive. 110

1. History of the Journalof the American ChemicalSociety Article Disclosure
At the core of Bristol's inequitable conduct claim was a scientific article
published by several of the inventors in the Journal of the American Chemical
Society ("JACS Article").111 This article was not disclosed to the Patent Office despite
being known by the inventors and the patent agent involved in the prosecution of the
application that became the '277 patent.
On November 3, 1987, the inventors submitted a draft of what became the JACS
Article to their French patent agent, Jacques Pilard. 112 In the draft JACS Article,
the inventors identified certain limitations regarding the use of several types of
protecting groups. 113 Specifically, the draft JACS Article stated that the conversion
of 10-DAB to Taxol® "could be successfully achieved only with specific protecting
groups and under unique reaction condition' and expressly identified limitations
114
and problems with two protecting groups acronymized as "MOM" and "TMS."
Two weeks later, Pilard recommended to the inventors that the draft publication
could be the subject of a patent application. 115 In January of 1988, RPR's licensing
department wrote to Pilard and suggested that a patent application be drafted

106 Id.
107Id. The method specifically involved "modifying 10-deacetylbaccatin III ("10-DAB") with an

acetyl group adding a (2R 3S) 3-phenylisoserine side chain ("the side chain") through an
esterification reaction." Id. "The inventors devised a method of utilizing "protecting groups" to
prevent particular hydroxyl groups on the 10-DAB core and side chain molecules from reacting in
side reactions and thereby preventing the formation of taxol." Id.
108Id. at 1233.
109 Id.
110Id. at 1229.
111 Id. at 1230. Entitled "A Highly Efficient, Practical Approach to Natural Taxol," the JACS
Article was written by four of the six inventors of the '277 patent. Td. The Article was submitted for

publication on April 20, 1988, and was published on August 17, 1988. Id.at 1231.
112

Id. at 1230.

113

Id.

114

Id.

(emphasis in original).

The draft article explained the limitations of several of the

protecting groups: 1) the Methoxymethyl ("MOM") protecting group at C-2' could not be removed
after esterification; 2) the trimethylsilyl (TMS") protecting group was unstable in the esterification
process; and 3) the tert-butyldimethylsilyl (TBDMS") group could not be cleanly introduced at C7.

Id.
I", Id.

[3:189 2004]

The Inequitable Conduct Defense Lives On

covering the inventors' semi-synthesis of Taxol®. 116 On March 7, 1988, two of the
inventors provided invention disclosures to Pilard entitled "Modes Operatoires"
which described the semi-synthesis of Taxol®.117 The "Modes Operatoires" reiterated
the JACS Article's report of limitations regarding the use of MOM and TMS
protecting groups. 118 Three days later, Pilard drafted a French patent application for
the semi-synthesis of Taxol®. 119 In drafting the application, however, Pilard left out
the limitations concerning the MOM and TMS protecting groups identified in the
draft JACS Article and Modes Operatoires. 120 In fact, Pilard not only identified that
MOM and TMS were permissible protecting groups, but that they were the preferred
protecting groups.121
Pilard sent his draft patent application to the inventors on March 18, 1988,
asking them to review it carefully, adding and modifying as they deemed
necessary. 122 The inventors returned the application without substantive change to
either the specification or claims. 123 Pilard filed the application on April 6, 1988.124
Two weeks later, the Journal of the American Chemical Society received the draft
JACS Article, 125 which was published on August 17, 1988.126
Pilard later contacted an American patent attorney, Ellsworth Mosher, to obtain
a United States Patent. Pilard did not provide Mosher with either the JACS Article
or the Modes Operatoires. 127 Mosher, using an English translation of Pilard's French
patent application, filed an application on April 3, 1989 that became United States
Patent No. 4,924,011 ("the '011 patent"). No one disclosed the JACS Article or the
Modes Operatoires to the Patent Office during the prosecution of the '011 patent
application. 128 In the prosecution, the Patent Office prepared a search report that
identified the JACS Article; however, the examiner failed to place his initials next to

"(6
117
118

Id.
Id.

Id.The "Modes Operatoires" states that in the invention: 1) the [TMS] group used in the

regioselective process proved too fragile in the esterifying reaction with the protected side chain; 2)
the protective reaction does not go forward with the TBDM chloride; and 3) Hydroxyl function of
side chain was protected by use of protective groups such as MOM, but did not state MOM could be
removed. Id.
11 Id.at 1231.
120Id.
121

Id. In claim 1 of the draft patent application, Pilard claimed the process as one:
'[I]n which R2 is a hydroxy-protecting group . . .[and] in which R3 is a hydroxyprotecting group,' without specifying any limitation as to the hydroxy-protecting
groups that could be used in the process. In claim 2 of the draft application, Mr.
Pilard claimed the process according to claim 1 'in which R2 is chosen from [MOM
and other compounds] .. . and R3 is chosen from trialkylsilyl groups in which each
alkyl portion contains one to three carbon atoms.'

Id.
122

Id.

12:
3 Id.
12 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128

Id.
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the article indicating that he considered it in issuing the patent. 129 On May 8, 1990,
130
the Patent Office issued the '011 patent.
On June 11, 1991, Pilard contacted a different patent attorney, Frederick
Calevetti, requesting legal assistance in filing a reissue patent application on the '011
patent. 13 1 Pilard attached a copy of the JACS Article to his letter.13 2 Footnote 16 of
the JACS Article, which discussed the limitation of using MOM in the semi-synthesis
of Taxol®, was circled (by an unknown person).133 Caveletti replied to Pilard on June
13, 1991, stating that the JACS Article would not affect the grant of the original '011
patent because the journal article was filed less than one year before the '011
application was filed. 13 4 Calvetti then filed the reissue '277 patent application on
November 1, 1991.135 In doing so, Calvetti did not disclose the JACS Article to the
Patent Office. 136 On July 17, 1992, Pilard sent a letter to Calvetti identifying prior
art including the JACS Article but stated in the letter, "[aiccording to our evaluation
these references are irrelevant." 137 Calvetti never identified the JACS Article during
138
any of his responses to the Patent Office actions.
In December of 1992, Pilard instructed Calvetti to provide a copy of the JACS
Article to the Patent Office. 13 9 The JACS Article was thus finally received by the
Patent Office on January 14, 1993.140 The Patent Office issued the '277 patent on
June 8, 1993.141

2. Materialityof the JACSArtele
On materiality, the Federal Circuit noted that the examiner had an obligation to
review the application for enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112.142 Based upon what
was submitted to the examiner, the examiner would have expected the use of MOM
and TMS protecting groups in performing the invention. 143 However, the undisclosed
JACS Article and Modes Operatoires conflicted with this recommendation.
Specifically, the JACS Article reported that the TMS group was unstable and that
the MOM group could not be removed. 144 This information was deemed to be highly
129
130

Id.
Id.

1:31Id.at

1232.

1:32Id.
1:3:3Id. Footnote 16 stated: "A methoxymethyl [(MOM")] protecting group at C-2' could not be
removed following esterification." Id. at 1230.
134 Id.at 1232.

135 Id.
1:36Id.

140

Id. at 1232-33.
Id.
Id.at 1233.
Id.

141

Id.

137
138
139

Id.at 1234. "The legal question of enablement involves an assessment of whether a patent
disclosure would have enabled one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the application was filed to
make and use the claimed invention without undue experimentation." Id. (citing Hybritech, Inc. v.
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
143 Id.
142

144

Id.
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material because, had it been disclosed to the examiner, it would have cast doubt
upon the invention's ability to produce Taxol®. 145 Bristol offered expert testimony
that one skilled in the art would understand the JACS Article to mean that use of the
MOM cannot produce Taxol®.146 A reasonable examiner would have wanted to know
whether the unsuccessful use of MOM and TMS affected the ability to perform the
invention.147

On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected arguments raised by RPR.148 RPR
argued that the examiner must have reviewed the JACS Article because it was
included in the search report found in the file history. 149 The Federal Circuit agreed
with the district court's finding that it could not be presumed that the examiner
reviewed the JACS Article where he had not checked off and initialed the
references. 150 No presumption of the Patent Office regularity arose in the absence of
objective evidence that the examiner actually reviewed the JACS Article prior to
151
issuing the '011 patent.
RPR also argued that because the examiner actually considered the JACS
Article during the '277 reissue prosecution and allowed the patent to issue, the JACS
Article was not material to patentability. 152 The Federal Circuit disagreed, stating
that the standard of materiality was: (a) not whether one particular examiner
considered the reference to be important, but instead, a reasonable examiner; 153 and
(b) a reference is not immaterial simply because the claims are eventually deemed by
an examiner to be patentable over the reference. 154 The court noted that it was not
enough that the withheld references were eventually provided to the examiner
155
because they "were not cited when they should have been."
The Federal Circuit was not persuaded that the district court gave insufficient
weight to Pilard's statement that the JACS Article was "irrelevant."' 156 The Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Pilard's statement was neither
persuasive nor credible. 157
All of RPR's arguments were rejected, and the
145 Id.
'16

147

Td. at 1234-35.
Id. at 1235.

148 Id.
149

Id.

150 Id. at 1236. Furthermore, as stated by the Federal Circuit:

The MPEP § 717.05 (5th ed. rev. 6 Oct. 1987) states that an examiner "should
indicate which publications [on a search printout] were reviewed by initialing and
dating the copy of the printout in the left margin adjacent to each reviewed
publication." Thus, had the Examiner been performing his duties "regularly," he
would have initialed and dated [next] . .. to the JACS article if he read it.
Id.
151

Id.

152
153

Id. at 1236-37.
Id. at 1237.

154

Id.

155Id.

156 Id. at 1237-38.
157

Id. at 1238. In doing so, the Federal Circuit stated:
[G]iven Mr. Pilard's extensive chemical engineering background, he would have
known that a person of ordinary skill in the art would read the statements in the
JACS article either to apply to TMS and MOM at any yield or, at the very least, to
be unclear.

Specifically, the district court could not reconcile Mr. Pilard's
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nondisclosure was found to be material from the standpoint of a reasonable patent
8
examiner.15

3. WithholdingJA CS Artiele With Intent to Deceive
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court's finding of an intent to
mislead the Patent Office by the withholding of the JACS Article. 159 The district
court found: 1) Pilard intentionally drew the '011 patent overly broad; 2) Pilard was
aware of the JACS Article at all times; and 3) Pilard was also aware of a patentee's
duty of candor and disclosure to the Patent Office. 160 The district court further found
that Pilard's justifications for nondisclosure of the JACS Article were insufficient and
not credible. 161 The Federal Circuit deferred to the district court's assessment of
Pilard's credibility.162
As it did with the element of materiality, the Federal Circuit rejected RPR's
arguments challenging the finding of intent to deceive the Patent Office by failing to
disclose the JACS Article. 163 First, RPR claimed that Pilard lacked the requisite
intent because he approved publication of the JACS Article without requesting the
omission or qualification of the statements regarding the limitations of the MOM and
TMS protecting groups.1 64 The Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that RPR's duty of
disclosure was to the Patent Office, and publication of the JACS Article did not
1 65
constitute a disclosure to the Patent Office.
The Federal Circuit also rejected RPR's argument that Pilard lacked intent
because he deemed the JACS Article irrelevant.1 66 In doing so, the court noted that
Pilard's statement came after the issuance of the '011 patent, and thus had no
1 67
bearing on Pilard's intent with regard to the prosecution of the '011 patent.
RPR's claim that its inventors had a good faith belief that the MOM and TMS
groups would work was also rejected. 168 The Federal Circuit found no such belief
articulated in the JACS Article. 169 Moreover, the court found RPR's intent not to

knowledge that "the protecting group at C-7 has to be stable ...to the subsequent
esterifying conditions" with his position that the statement in the JACS article,
TMS "proved unstable to the subsequent esterification conditions," was not
adverse.

Td.
158
Id. at 1238-39.
159Id. at 1239-41.
160 Id. at 1239.
1i Id.
1 2 Id. at 1240 n.10. In doing so, the Court noted that Pilard did not even appear at the hearing

on intent. Td. Consequently, the district court used portions of his videotaped depositions and a
transcript of his depositions to assess his credibility. Id. The district court noted that Pilard's
responses at that deposition were less than candid. Id.
1 3 Id. at 1240.
161
Id. at 1241.
165
100

Id.
Id.

107 Id.
168 Id.
1 9 Id.
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disclose the JACS Article was at issue, and not whether there was a good faith belief
i0
that their invention was enabled."
Lastly, RPR argued that Pilard lacked the requisite intent because it was
permissible for him to seek broad patent rights.171 The Federal Circuit found this
argument missed the point.17 2 The issue was not that RPR could not seek broad
patent rights, but rather that the motivation of seeking broad patent rights
evidenced an impetus for Pilard intentionally withholding the JACS Article from the
17 3
Patent Office.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court in finding that Bristol
had met its burden by proving, with clear and convincing evidence, a material
nondisclosure and an intent to deceive. 174 Failure to disclose the JACS Article with
intent to mislead the Patent Office resulted in a finding of inequitable conduct and
175
unenforceability of the '277 patent.
C. Dayeo Products,Inc., v. Total Containment,Ine."16
Dayco Products, Inc., ("Dayco") sued Total Containment, Inc., ("TCl') for
infringement of four patents ("patents-in-suit") related to flexible hoses and couplings
for use in underground gas containment systems. 177 TCI moved for summary
judgment based on purported inequitable conduct committed by Dayco during the
prosecution of the patents-in-suit. 178 The district court granted TCT's motion finding
the patents unenforceable.1 7 9 The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, finding
that summary judgment was improper because there were genuine issues of material
fact to be resolved at trial.180
The patents-in-suit originated as a series of continuation applications to United
States Application Serial No. 408,161 filed on September 15, 1989 ("the '161
application").181 On August 6, 1991, the '161 application issued as United States
Patent No. 5,037,143 ("the '143 patent").182
Dayco was also the assignee of a separate family of patents that claim original
priority to United States Application Serial No. 993,196 ("the '196 family") filed on

170
171

Td.
Id. at 1242.

172 Id.
17:3Id.

Id.
Id.
176 329 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

174
175
177

Id. at 1360. The four patents-in-suit were: U.S. Patent Nos. 5,199,752 ("the '752 patent"),

5,297,822 ("the '822 patent"), 5,380,050 ("the '050 patent"), and 5,486,023 ("the '023 patent")
(collectively "the patents-in-suit").
178 Id.
TCI also moved for summary judgment of invalidity on certain claims of these patents.

Id.
179
180
181
182

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1361.
U.S. Patent No. 5,037,143 (issued Aug. 6, 1991).
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December 18, 1992.183 The technology disclosed in the '196 family is substantially
identical to that disclosed in the '161 family of applications.184
Both the applications for the patents-in-suit and the '196 family of applications
were drafted by the same attorney, and both were pending at the Patent Office at the
same time.185
However, the applications had been assigned to two different
examiners at the Patent Office.18 6 The '196 family of applications included specific
references to the applications for the patents-in-suit.1 8 7 However, the applications for
the patents-in-suit from the '161 family of applications, made no reference to the
applications in the '196 family.188 The patents-in-suit issued without an indication
18 9
that the examiner was aware of applications and patents in the '196 family
During prosecution of the applications in the '196 family, the examiner, on three
separate occasions, rejected the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being obvious over
United States Patent No. 3,331,981 ("the Wilson reference") and another reference. 190
The Wilson reference was never cited by Dayco to the examiner of the applications
for the patents-in-suit. 191
TCI moved for summary judgment based on inequitable conduct. 192 The district
court granted TCI's motion, holding the patents to be unenforceable based on
inequitable conduct. 193 The district court cited three facts as its basis for finding
unenforceability:
(1) pendency of the '196 application before a different examiner;
(2) the Wilson patent; and
(3) the obviousness rejection of claims in the '196 application based on
194
Wilson.
195
The Federal Circuit overturned the district court's inequitable conduct findings.

183 Dayeo, 329 F.3d at 1361. "The '196 application itself was abandoned during prosecution,
and two continuation applications, U.S. Application Nos. 197,891 ("the '891 application") and
263,275 ("the '275 application"), were filed claiming priority therefrom. The '891 and '275
applications respectively issued as U.S. Patent Nos. 5,356,182 ("the '182 patent") and 5,430,929 ("the
'929 patent")." Id.
184 Id. The technology disclosed in the '196 family is directed to flexible hoses and coupling
assemblies. Id.
185 Id. at 1365.
186 Id.
at 1361.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189

Id.

190 Id. at 1361. Claims submitted in the '196 family of applications were rejected as being
unpatentable over United States Patent No. 3,331,981 ("Wilson") in view of United States Patent
No. 5,096,234 ("Oetiker").
191Id. at 1362.
192
193
194

Id.
Id.
Id.

195 Id. at 1363-64. The Federal Circuit initially reviewed the standard for materiality applied
by the PTO, which was altered in 1992 during the prosecution of the patents-in-suit. Id. at 1363.
The Court stated: "for many years this court has held that materiality for purposes of an inequitable
conduct determination required a showing that a 'reasonable examiner' would have considered such
prior art important in deciding whether to allow the parent application." Id. The information did
not need to be prior art, but merely any information a reasonable examiner would be likely to
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The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that materiality was
established. 196 The Manual of PatentExaminingProcedure("M.P.E.P.") required the
inventors to disclose the existence of the co-pending '196 application to the examiner
of the applications for the patents-in-suit. 197 Citing Akron Polymer Container Corp.,
v. Exxel Container, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that under the "reasonable
examiner" standard of materiality, "[an] application was highly material to the
prosecution of [an application, where] it could have conceivably served as the basis of
a double patenting rejection." 198 Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that had Dayco
disclosed the '196 application to the examiner, the examiner could have rejected the
applications that issued as the patents-in-suit because of the prohibition against
double patenting.199

Dayco claimed that there was no double patenting issue because the patents-insuit were subject to a terminal disclaimer limiting their terms to the priority date of
the '143 patent which would be shorter than any patent that could have conceivably
issued from the '196 application.2 00 Thus, information as to the pendency of the '196
application was irrelevant and could not be material. The Federal Circuit rejected
Dayco's argument noting that the shortening of the term of the patent is not the only
effect of filing a terminal disclaimer. 20 1 The terminal disclaimer also would have
subjected the patents-in-suit to a common ownership limitation with the '196
family. 20 2 Thus, the failure to disclose the co-pending '196 patent did not subject
them to this limitation, and was found to be material.
While affirming the district court's findings of materiality, the Federal Circuit
found that TCJ failed to establish Dayco's deceptive intent.2 0 3 The Federal Circuit,
citing Akron Polymer, indicated that "intent could not be inferred because the
patentee did 'disclose the existence of the application [that became the patents-inconsider important in determining patentability. Id. In 1992, the PTO amended its rules and more
narrowly defined materiality.
Id.
Material art either establishes "a prima facie case of
unpatentability" or "refutes, or is inconsistent with a position an applicant takes." Id. at 1364. The
Federal Circuit, without applying a specific standard, agreed with the district court finding of
materiality. Id. The Court indicated that because of the restrictive effect of a possible doublepatenting rejection, nondisclosure of the '196 applications was clearly material under either
standard. Id. at 1366.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 1365. The M.P.E.P. § 2001.06(b) states in relevant part: [I]f a[n] . . . inventor has
different applications pending in which similar subject matter but patentably indistinct claims are
present, that fact must be disclosed to the examiner of each of the involved applications. Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure, 8th ed. Rev. 1, (2003).
198 Dayco, 329 F.3d at 1365 (citing Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxe] Container, Inc.,
148 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Under the double patenting doctrine an inventor is prohibited
from obtaining "a second patent for claims that are not patentably distinct from the claims of a first
patent." In re Lonardo, 119 F.3d 960, 965 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
199 Dayco, 329 F.3d at 1366.
200 Id.
201

I-d.

202 Id. Had Dayco disclosed the '196 applications, it could have received a double patenting
rejection from the examiner.
Id. To overcome this rejection Dayco must file a terminal
disclaimer, which includes a provision stating: "that any patent granted on that application.., shall
be enforceable only for and during such period that said patent is commonly owned with the
application or patent which formed the basis for the rejection." 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(c)(3) (2002)
(emphasis added).
203 Dayco, 329 F.3d at 1366.
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suit] to the ['196] application's examiner, and thus put the Patent Office on notice of
the co-pendency of the two applications.'204 Because the examiner of the '196 patent
application was notified of the '161 application's existence, no intent to deceive could
20 5
be inferred.
The Federal Circuit also reversed the district court's finding of materiality and
intent to deceive based upon the nondisclosure of the Wilson reference. 20 6 Dayco
submitted a declaration from its expert explaining why the Wilson reference was not
submitted. 20 7 The expert explained that Wilson was from the field of electrical
20 8
conduits, which he felt did not address the point of novelty of the patents-in-suit.
Thus, the Federal Circuit held that this evidence created a question of material fact
20 9
that precluded summary judgment.
The Federal Circuit also ruled that "[i]ntent to deceive cannot be inferred simply
from the decision to withhold the reference where the reasons given for the
withholding are plausible." 210 Dayco submitted an affidavit from the attorney who
prosecuted the applications, who explained that in good faith he considered the
2 11
Wilson reference to be far afield from the accused patents at the time it was cited.
212
The Federal Circuit found this explanation plausible.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit held the fact that the examiner found the Wilson
reference to be material, while informative, was not dispositive. 2 13 For these reasons,
the Federal Circuit reversed the district court and found that TCI failed to make a
214
threshold showing of materiality or intent in connection with the Wilson reference.
In remanding the issue to the trial court, the Federal Circuit noted that on the
present record, there was no basis for a claim of unenforceability concerning the
failure to disclose the co-pending '196 application or the Wilson patent. 215 Absent the
discovery of material new evidence, the Federal Circuit directed the district court to
216
entertain summary judgment of no inequitable conduct.

204 Id.
2 5 Id.

Id.at 1367.
Id. at 1366.
208 Id.
Dayco's expert also opined that two references cited to the examiner were also
206
207

cumulative of the Wilson reference. Id.
209 Id.
2o10 d.
211 Id.
212

Id.

213

Id.

Id. The Federal Circuit also addressed the district court's finding that Dayco's failure to
disclose the rejection of the substantially similar co-pending '196 application was a material
omission. In doing so, it stated that it had not addressed this issue previously. _Td.In affirming the
district court's finding, the Federal Circuit announced that under the Akron Polymer "reasonable
examiner" standard and under new Rule 56, a contrary decision of another examiner reviewing
substantially similar claims meets the threshold of materiality. _Td.at 1368. However, the district
court made no finding on the issue of intent. Id. Thus, a trial on the issue was necessary. Id.
215 Id.at 1371.
216 Id.at 1371.
214
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D. Ulead Systems, Inc., v. Lex Computer & Management Corp.21
In the most recent of the Federal Circuit decisions addressing the issue of
inequitable conduct, Ulead Systems, Inc. ("Ulead") brought a declaratory judgment
action of invalidity and unenforceability of Lexmark Computer & Management
Corporation's ("Lex") United States Patent No. 4,538,188 ("the '188 patent").218 In its
complaint, Ulead charged that the '188 patent was unenforceable and invalid because
Lex misrepresented to the Patent Office that it qualified as a small entity to avoid
paying the higher periodic maintenance fee for its '188 patent. 219 Ulead moved for
220
summary judgment based on unenforceability.
The district court agreed with Ulead, and on summary judgment, declared Lex's
'188 patent unenforceable because Lex had intentionally misrepresented itself to the
Patent Office as qualifying for small entity status. 221 The district court found Lex's
misrepresentation material. 222 The Federal Circuit remanded, finding that while Lex
had made a material misrepresentation to the Patent Office concerning its status as
223
a small entity, genuine issues of fact remained as to intent.

1. The District Courts Findingof Inequitable Conduct
When Lex acquired the '188 patent in 1986, it had fewer than twenty
employees. 224 When Lex paid its first maintenance fee in 1988, Lex properly paid the
fee at the reduced rate. 225 Later, Lex granted several non-exclusive licenses to
companies with more than 500 employees. 226 These entities did not qualify for small
entity status under 37 C.F.R. § 1.9.227 After granting these licenses, Lex submitted
its second maintenance fee for the '188 patent to the Patent Office, along with a
217 351
218
219

F.3d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1143.

220 d.
221 Id.

222Id.
223
224

Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1142.

225 Id.

As stated by the Federal Circuit:
The PTO rules define a "small entity" as a small business concern, independent
inventor, or non-profit organization. 37 C.F.R. § 1.9(f) "Small business concern" is
defined in accordance with the definition established by the Small Business
Administration (SBA"). 37 C.F.R. § 1.9(d). The applicable SBA regulation states
as follows: a small business concern for purposes of paying reduced fees ... to the
Patent and Trademark Office means any business concern (1) whose number of
employees, including those of its affiliates, does not exceed 500 persons and (2)
which has not assigned, granted, conveyed, or licensed, and is under no obligation
under contract or law to assign, grant, convey or license, any rights in the
invention to any person who could not be classified as an independent inventor if
that person had made the invention, or to any concern which would not qualify as
a small business concern or a nonprofit organization under this section.

226 Id.

at 1142.

Id.
227

Id.
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petition that included a Verified Statement Claiming Small Entity Status. 228 The
verified statement stated in relevant part: "no rights . . .are held by any person ...
who could not qualify as a small business concern under 37 C.F.R. § 1.9(d)."229 The
Patent Office accepted the reduced fee. 230 When Lex submitted its third maintenance
231
fee, it again represented its entitlement to small entity status.
After Ulead moved for summary judgment of inequitable conduct, Lex
immediately acted to correct the error in fee payment by submitting the balance of
the deficiency to the Patent Office, in accordance with the procedures for correcting
the erroneous underpayment. 232
The Patent Office accepted the payment and
233
changed Lex's status.
In response to Ulead's motion for summary judgment, Lex admitted it was not
entitled to claim small entity status and was not entitled to the reduced rates at the
time it paid its second and third maintenance fees. 234 While Lex claimed that it had
innocently claimed small entity status and failed to pay the proper fee, 235 the district
court granted Ulead's motion, holding the patent unenforceable because of Lex's
236
misrepresentation to the Patent Office.

2. The FederalCircuit Vacates and Remands
The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's finding of
inequitable conduct. 237 In doing so, it stated that there was no serious question as to
the materiality of the misrepresentation to the Patent Office. 238
The
misrepresentation that Lex qualified as a small entity was material to the Patent
Office's acceptance of the reduced maintenance fees, and thus, survival of the
23 9
patent.
However, the Federal Circuit found that there was a genuine issue of material
fact in dispute as to intent unresolvable on summary judgment. 240 As pointed out by
228 Id. Lex had also apparently let his patent lapse and submitted a petition to reinstate or
revive, which was accepted by the Patent Office. Id.
229
) Id. at 1142-43.
230

Id.

231

Id.at 1143.

232 Id.
2:3:3
ITd.
234

Id.

235 Id.
236 Id.
237

Id.

Id. at 1146. In a strong dissent issued by Justice Newman, she challenged that the
underpayment of fees is not a matter of inequitable conduct. Id. at 1151. Rather, Justice Newman
would require proof of fraudulent conduct associated with fee payment. Id. Justice Newman noted
the differences between the inequitable conduct standard and the Walker Process fraud standard, as
explained in Nobolpharma AB v.Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Specifically, the action of fraud cannot be maintained without showing affirmative knowledge of its
falsity. Id. The history of 37 U.S.C. § 1.28(c) governing the maintenance fees to be paid by small
entity refers to fraud, rather than to inequitable conduct, and Justice Newman felt it inappropriate
to apply an inequitable test to this provision of the Federal Code. Id.at 1150-56.
239 Id. at 1146.
240 Id.
238
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the court, Lex's president, Mr. Haberman, testified that he was not aware that a non241
exclusive license to a large entity would result in the loss of small entity status.
The court noted, despite the fact that Lex's president is a lawyer, his primary
expertise was real estate law. 242 The court also found that the Patent Office form to
be submitted with the small entity fee was ambiguous. 243 Unlike the codified
244
regulation, the small entity form used does not specifically refer to licensing.
Lex also provided the declaration from its patent counsel, Mr. Weiner
("Weiner"), who testified that he did not intend to deceive the Patent Office. 245 While
Weiner testified that he understood the law governing the qualifications for small
entity status, he was unaware until after Ulead raised the issue in this case that Lex
246
had entered into any licenses with companies having more than 500 employees.
Lex's patent counsel further indicated that "he did not directly represent Lex in
acquiring any of its licenses" and "was unaware that Lex had finalized license
agreements" with entities having more than 500 employees. 247 The Federal Circuit
found Lex's patent counsel's statements were plausible and the misrepresentation
248
appeared to be negligent, rather than made with actual intent to deceive.
Consequently, the court concluded that a trial on the issue of intent was required to
249
assess the credibility of the witnesses would be assessed.

IV.

NECESSITY AND EFFECT OF A PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION AS TO LACK OF INTENT TO

DECEIVE IN LIGHT OF HOFFMANN, BRIsTOL-MYERs, DAYCOAND ULEAD

Nothing in these recent Federal Circuit decisions changes the law that even high
250
materiality alone is not enough to support a finding of inequitable conduct.
However, the Federal Circuit's decisions in Hoffmann-La Roche, Bristol-Myers,
Dayco, and Ulead suggest that conduct surrounding a misrepresentation or
withholding of highly material information may be so suspect, or at least can be cast
so negatively, that proceeding without a plausible explanation of the conduct raises
an unacceptable risk of an inequitable conduct finding.
Interestingly, the more highly technical the subject matter of the dispute, the
greater the uncertainty of whether the challenged err or omission will be considered
material. This may dictate a need to provide a plausible explanation of the conduct.
While strengthening the defense to an inequitable conduct charge, providing such an
explanation may open the door to intrusive and costly discovery.

241 Id.
242

Id. at 1147.

24 3 Id.
244 Id.

Specifically, the 1993 declaration stated: [i]f the rights held by the above-identified
small business concern are not exclusive, each individual, concern or organization having rights to

the invention is listed below and no rights to the invention are held by any person ... who could not
qualify as a small business concern under 37 C.F.R. 1.9(d)." _Td.
245 Id.
2406Id.
247

Id.

248

Id. at 1148.

24 9 Id.
250Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
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A. FactualUnderpinningsBearingon MaterialityCan Raise an Inference ofIntent
Sufficient to Support a Findingof Inequitable Conduct
In Bristol-Myers, the facts surrounding withholding the clearly material JACS
Article gave rise to a strong inference of intent to mislead and ultimately a finding of
inequitable conduct. 251 In Hoffmann-La Roche, the court found that because there
was an affirmative misrepresentation that tests had been performed rather than
merely an omission of information, the misrepresentation was judged more
material. 252 Thus, the facts surrounding this material misrepresentation also
provided the basis for an inference of intent to deceive the Patent Office, sufficient to
support a finding of inequitable conduct. 253 In both Bristol-Myers and Hoffmann -La
Roehe the inference of intent to deceive the Patent Office was not adequately
rebutted.

B. Providing 'A PlausibleExplanation"Is Essential When a Credible Inference of
Deceptive Intent Can Be Made
In Dayeo and Ulead,unlike Hoffmann -La Roche and Bristol-Myers,there was no
finding of inequitable conduct because "a plausible explanation" was provided for the
questioned conduct.2 54 In Dayeo, the Federal Circuit agreed that the failure to
disclose the '196 family of applications as part of the prosecution of applications in
the '161 patent family was material.2 55 Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit found the
2 56
district court erred regarding the required intent element of inequitable conduct.
In doing so, the court reaffirmed that the applicable standard for the intent element
is an intent to deceive, not merely an intent to withhold.25 7 Evaluated on that basis,
the evidence offered by the patentee regarding a lack of intent to deceive the Patent
Office was found to be "plausible," and thus sufficient, to avoid finding inequitable
conduct on summary judgment.
Specifically, in Dayeo, the declaration of the attorney, who prosecuted the
patent, explained that in good faith he had concluded the withheld Wilson reference
was not material.25 8 He explained he did not consider it prior art because "he
251 Bristol-Meyers

Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1239-40 (Fed. Cir.

2003).
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1366 67.
254 Dayeo, 329 F.3d at 1367; Uead, 351 F.3d at 1147-48; see also CFMT, Inc., v. Yieldup Int'l
252
253

Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1342-43.
This court recognizes that a district court may infer intent to deceive the PTO.
However, even gross negligence does not alone suffice to establish intent. Instead,
'the involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence
indicative of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of
intent to deceive'.
CFMT, 349 F.3d at 1342-43 (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d
867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
255Dayeo, 329 F.3d at 1366.

Id.
Id. at 1367.
258Id.
256
257
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considered it far afield from the accused patents at the time it was cited." 259 The

Federal Circuit found that explanation plausible and suggested Dayco's good faith
260
sufficient for remand.
As in Dayeo, the Federal Circuit agreed in Uleadwith the district court's finding
that the misrepresentation of entitlement to small entity status was material;
however, it vacated the district court's finding of intent to deceive in view of the
patentee's evidence that an innocent error occurred. 261 Specifically, in Uead, the
declarations of the patentee's general counsel and patent counsel were found at
summary judgment to be sufficient to overcome any presumption of intent that
attached as a consequence of the material misrepresentation to the Patent Office that
262
Lex qualified as small entity.

In contrast to Dayco and Ulead, the patentee in Hoffmann-La Roche offered no
evidence that use of the past tense in Example VI (describing an experiment that was
never performed) was merely an oversight by the inventor. 263 Nor did the inventor
provide a reasonable explanation as to why he used past tense in the patent when, in
the context of a scientific publication, to do so would clearly imply that the
experiment was actually performed. 264 As stated by the court:
There was no suggestion by Roche that the use of the past tense in Example
VI was an oversight-Dr. Gelfand admitted he understood that, at least in a
scientific publication, the use of the past tense means that an experiment
was actually performed. He provided no reasonable explanation as to why a
different principle would apply in a patent application. Nor did Roche
introduce any other evidence to explain why the past tense was used to
describe an experiment that was not performed. Accordingly, the district
court did not clearly err in determining that the inventors' use of the past
265
tense in Example VI was knowingly false.

The misrepresentation concerning Example VI was clearly material. 266 The facts
surrounding Example VI and what it described gave rise to the inference of intent267
an inference found not to have been rebutted in a meaningful fashion.
Similarly, in regards to Hoffmann La Roche's misrepresentations with respect to
the fidelity issue, Promega offered testimony of an expert in the field who had
allegedly worked with the inventors. 268 The Promega expert testified that he was
aware of the inventors' knowledge of template dependency and fidelity and that the
inventors could not possibly believe the representations they were making were
259Id.
2060Id.
261Ulead
262 Id. at

Sys., Inc. v. Lex Computer & Mgmt. Corp., 351 F.3d 1139, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
1146-48. The materiality of an erroneous representation of small entity status was
an issue of disagreement between the majority and Judge Newman as expressed in her dissent. d.
at 1151.
2 3 Hoffmann-La Roche,
204 Id.
2 5 Id.
266Id. at 1368.
267 Id. at 1367-68.
268

Id. at 1371-72.

Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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accurate. 269 Again, Hoffman-La Roche failed to put forward any evidence to suggest
that its inventors' interpretation of the prior art testing, while inaccurate, was
reasonable. 270 Thus, the only evidence before the court was the expert testimony of
271
the accused infringer, who felt very strongly that the inventors knew better.
In Bristol-Myers, the failure to disclose the JACS Article in the prosecution of
the '011 patent was clearly a material omission and the facts surrounding the failure
to disclose the article raised a strong inference of intent. 272 Strong rebuttal evidence
was needed. Instead, as found by the court, the patentee offered implausible
testimony to rebut intent.
The district court viewed the patent agent's testimony that the prior art article
that was withheld was "irrelevant"273 as being neither persuasive, nor credible, given
the clear materiality of the article. 274 The Federal Circuit commented on the district
court's finding, indicating that given the extensive chemical engineering background
of the patent agent, he knew or should have known that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would read the statements in the withheld article as applying to the subject
matter of the patent. 275 The decision of the Federal Circuit was clear: to counter the
inference of deceptive intent, based on the circumstances surrounding withholding
the highly material JACS Article, something more than the conclusionary testimony
276
of the patent agent was required.
Because the facts underlying a finding of materiality can also give rise to an
inference of intent to deceive, the need for evidence countering any such inference of
intent to deceive increases as the level of materiality rises. In Hoffmann-La Roche
and Bristol-Myers, the failure to provide any credible evidence ("plausible
explanation") supported a finding of inequitable conduct in each case. Contrastingly,
in Dayco and Ulead, the patentee offered a credible explanation for the challenged
conduct, at least for the purposes of avoiding summary judgment.

V. A

PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION MAY WAIVE PRIVILEGE

While a plausible explanation can counter an inference of deceptive intent,
conduct asserted to be improper in connection with withholding or misrepresenting
material information does not come without a cost. When confronted with withheld
prior art or an erroneous statement to the Patent Office, the need to provide an
explanation for the error or omission may require that the patentee introduce
otherwise privileged communications.

271

Id.
Id. at 1372.
I-d. at 1371-72.

272

Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1239-40 (Fed. Cir.

269
270

2003).
273
274

Id. at 1237-38.
Id. at 1238.

27 5 Id.
276 For example, there was no indication of credible testimony as to why the patent agent felt
the article was "irrelevant."
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For example, the Federal Circuit has held that an invention record is a
privileged attorney-client communication. 277 However, providing the "plausible
explanation" to refute any inference of deceptive intent may require the disclosure of
client communications that are part of the invention record. If such a disclosure is
278
made, attorney-client privilege will likely be waived.

Waiver of attorney client privilege of communications to support an inequitable
conduct charge is exemplified in Winbond Eleetronies Corp. v. International Trade
Commission.27 9 There, the plaintiff, Amtel, filed a complaint with the International
Trade Commission ("ITC") alleging that Macronix International, Co., Ltd, and
Windbond Electronics Corp., (among others) were importing, selling for importation,
or selling in the United States semiconductor chips that infringed Amtel's United
States Patent No. 4,451,903 ("the '903 patent).280 The alleged infringers responded,
claiming that the '903 patent was invalid for failing to name Anil Gupta ("Gupta") as
28 1
a co-inventor on the '903 patent.
During the first ITC hearing, Gupta testified that he was not an inventor of the
'903 patent's claimed device. 28 2

Gupta testified that he merely implemented the

element of the invention using well-known techniques. 28 3 However, Gupta also
testified that he designed circuits that were part of the structure corresponding to
the means-plus-function claims of the invention. 28 4 The administrative law judge
("ALJ") concluded that Gupta was in fact an inventor of the '903 patent, and the
failure to list Gupta as an inventor rendered the patent unenforceable. 285 The ITC,
looking at the ALJ's decision, stated that it had no power to correct the inventorship
of the '903 patent, and therefore affirmed the finding of the ALJ that the patent was
286
unenforceable until either the Patent Office or a court corrected the record.
In response, Amtel filed a Certification of Correction with the Patent Office
identifying Mr. Gupta as a named inventor. 287 In his declaration to the Patent Office,
Gupta stated:
The standard for inventorship as it relates to the 903 patent has been
explained to me. Based on my understanding of that standard, I hereby
state that I have made an inventive contribution to the subject matter
277 In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 806 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (technical
information is privileged as long as it is provided to an attorney "for the purpose of securing

primarily legal opinion, or legal services, or assistance in a legal proceeding.") Spalding contrasted
directly with a line of cases, including Jack Winter, Inc., v. Koratron Co., 50 F.R.D. 225, 228 (N.D.
Cal. 1970), which held that such technical information communicated to an attorney, and documents
relating to the prosecution of patent applications are non-privileged.
278 See, e.g., GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Where patent
attorney testified at an earlier trial about prior art and communications with client, the privilege
was waived to all communications and documents related to that same subject).
279 No. 01-1031, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25113 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
280 I-d. at *6.The Complaint was filed in January of 1997. Id. at *31.
281Id. at *6.
282

Id. at *6-7.

28 3 Id.

at *7.

Id. at *23.
285, Id. at *7.
281

28 Id.
287

Id. at *8-9.
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claimed in the 903 patent, whereby I am a co-inventor of the claimed
288
subject matter of the 903 patent.
Amtel then petitioned the ITC for a rehearing. 28 9 At the rehearing, the ITC
remanded the matter to the ALJ who again found the '903 patent unenforceable for
listing the wrong inventors. 290 During the course of the second hearing, the ALJ
ordered Amtel to disclose privileged documents concerning the inventors of the '903
292
patent. 291 Amtel again appealed the ALJ's decision to the ITC.
At the rehearing of the ALJ's second decision, the ITC found that Amtel had not
committed inequitable conduct before the Patent Office based upon Gupta's
explanation. 293 The ITC did agree with the ALJ's finding that Amtel had waived
attorney-client privilege and was required to produce all documents otherwise
protectable by the work product doctrine. 294 The ITC stated: "Amtel explicitly placed
the legal advice to [Mr.] Gupta-and the fact that [Mr.] Gupta had obtained legal
advice-'at issue' in these proceedings. 2 95
The Federal Circuit affirmed the ALJ's finding (and ITC's affirmance) that
Amtel had waived the attorney-client privilege. 296 The scope of the waiver included
all communications and on all documents from the time period when Amtel was
preparing for the ITC's initial review (January 1997), up to the time before Amtel
297
petitioned the ITC for the second reconsideration hearing.
Attorney-client communications may provide strong evidence that there was no
attempt to withhold information or to otherwise deceive the patent examiner
(rebutting an inference of intent). However, use of such communications will put
them at issue, resulting in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 298 That being the
case, the scope of the waiver becomes a significant issue.
In Winbond, Amtel could not dispute that a waiver occurred. 299 Rather, Amtel
attempted to narrow the scope of the waiver to the time period after the ITC issued
its initial decision addressing inventorship law, but before Amtel filed its correction
with the Patent Office.300 Because Amtel had placed Gupta's understanding of the
law in issue in its petition for reconsideration, the Federal Circuit commented
288

Id. at *23-24.
*9.

281)Id.at
290

Id.

This time the ALJ found Gupta should not have been listed as a co-inventor because the

inventors had withheld material information from the PTO in issuing the certificate of correction.

Id.

291 Id. at
292 Id. at
293Id.
294 Id.
29 5

*9-10.
*10.

_d. at *31.
Id. at *33. Under the ALJ's Order, Atmel was not required to produce any documents
generated before January 1997, when Atmel filed its complaint with the ITC. Id.at *31. The
296

administrative law judge also limited the scope of the disclosure so that Atmel was not required to
produce attorney-client communications or attorney work product made in preparation for the 1998
reconsideration hearing. Id. "The Commission affirmed the administrative law judge's temporal

limitations on the scope of Atmel's waiver." Id.
297 Id. at *33.
298 Id.
2 99

Id.at *31.
*31-*32.

00 Id.at
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approvingly on the ALJ's determination that the period of waiver should include the
time when Amtel filed its complaint with the ITC up to the time just before Amtel
301
petitioned the ITC for a rehearing.
In considering the use of otherwise privileged information to explain or counter
an assertion of intentional deception of the Patent Office, one must appreciate that
the potential scope of the waiver may be broad. To shed light on the motivations of
the patentee or its representatives, the waiver could extend to all discussions and
documents regarding the patentee's views of the patents or prior art that are
considered.
Faced with possible unenforceability of the patent, the existence of credible
"materiality" issues can force the patentee to waive privileged communications in
order to withstand a charge of inequitable conduct. Such waiver can lead to far more
intrusive and costly discovery activities. An accused infringer is more apt to tolerate,
if not embrace, extensive discovery to avoid the specter of patent infringement,
enhanced damages, and damages and payment of attorney's fees. As evidenced by
Hoffmann-La Roche and Bristol-Myers, sometimes the defense succeeds. Including
the decisions in Dayco and Ulead,one can see that employing the inequitable conduct
defense adds complexity and cost to the underlying patent dispute. Given the high
stakes of winning or losing patent infringement cases, inequitable conduct battles
can be expected to continue.

VI. CONCLUSION
Hoffmann-La Roehe, Bristol-Myers, Dayco, and Ulead do not appear to have
changed the basic inequitable conduct assessments of materiality and intent to
deceive the Patent Office. However, when the level of materiality of the withheld or
inaccurate information presented to the Patent Office increases, these decisions
reiterate the need for measured, adequate, and credible explanations to establish
good faith during the prosecution of the patent to rebut an inference of deceptive
intent.

301 Id.

at *32-33.

